讲座题目 | When Speed Becomes a Target: Deadlines, Disclosure, and Outcomes in Judicial Foreclosure Auctions | ||
性爱影片 （单位） | 周启曜 （俄克拉荷马州立大学） | 主持人 （单位） | 刘修岩 （性爱影片 ） |
讲座时间 | 2026年7月2日 （周四）10：00 | 讲座地点 | 文科楼313会议室 |
性爱影片 简介 |
周启曜，俄克拉荷马州立大学经济学系助理教授，马里兰大学经济学博士，曾主要研究领域为产业组织理论，区域与城市经济学，研究成果发表于Journal of Urban Economics，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ，Environmental and Resource Economics等期刊。 | ||
讲座内容摘要 | Performance targets can improve public-sector throughput while distorting less observable dimensions of quality. This paper studies this trade-off in China’s civil and commercial judiciary, where year-end case-closure rate and auction-to-case rate create incentives to resolve cases before December 31. Using online judicial foreclosure auctions, we examine how deadline pressure affects judicial timing, information disclosure, and market outcomes. Auction listings increase sharply in late December, consistent with evaluation-driven bunching. At the same cutoff, judges reduce disclosure of risk-related information such as occupancy, leases, and ownership certificate completeness while leaving standardized housing disclosures largely unchanged. This deterioration in risk-related information quality has real effects: post-auction default by winning bidders increases significantly, despite substantial deposit forfeiture. The patterns disappear in relisted auctions, where disclosure is mechanically carried over, and are weaker in courts facing less year-end pressure. The results show how measurable deadlines can undermine transparency and transaction reliability in markets. | ||
